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Successful approaches to fighting corruption are
not aimed at removing the proverbial rotten apple
from the barrel, but at tackling the barrel itself
(Van der Beken 2002:273). Therefore, the aim of
the DCS should be to fix the system that creates
the conditions for corrupt acts to be committed.
Prison systems are by their nature not transparent,
and the risk of officials operating with little
restraint or accountability is therefore
considerable. 
Institutions such as these have been referred to as
'calm biopes' - 'areas in which, with organisation
and control, corruption structures develop, grow
and prosper over the years' (Nötzel 2002:51). Good
governance and anti-corruption measures intend
to prevent such 'calm biopes' from developing in
organisations and to prevent officials from
controlling organisations or parts thereof that they
might otherwise attempt to exploit for private gain. 
The DCS has a special relationship with the SIU,
but the assistance from the SIU should be seen as
only one pillar of the anti-corruption effort of the
DCS, the other three pillars being prevention,
public awareness, and institution building (Pope
1999). As important as investigations and law
enforcement are, they remain components of a
strategy that must address the problem
holistically. The key question then is whether
sufficient progress has been made to disturb the
'calm biopes' and ensure that there is no safe
haven for officials intent on misusing their public
office for private gain.  
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRISON
CORRUPTION
Corruption in the prison system holds particular
significance. Failing to address it holds severe
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Following a briefing by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) to the Portfolio Committee on Correctional
Services regarding its investigations into corruption, fraud and maladministration in the Department of
Correctional Services (DCS), this was one journalist's response: 'Members of parliament were stunned by
a report on the endemic nature of corruption in the Department of Correctional Services, detailing cases
of tender rigging, medical aid fraud and petrol card abuse' (De Lange 2008). The report to Parliament
raises a number of questions: Is this department irredeemably beyond salvation? What still needs to be
done and what is being done to prevent and combat corruption? Are there any successes? These questions
are explored in this article.
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risks (for taxpayers and victims), but also
undermines the very integrity of the penal system
by eroding the intended just and morally
justifiable punishment of the offender. The prison
serves a particular moral function in society and,
if there is to be any hope that the prisoner will
perceive his or her punishment as justly
administered, should execute its task to the
highest possible standard, untainted by dishonesty
or even impressions of impropriety (Muntingh
2006b:6). 
For analytical purposes it is important to
distinguish between types of corruption present in
the prison system. They can be categorised by
three fundamental relationships: between warders
and prisoners, between warders (as employees)
and the DCS as employer, and between external
agents, officials and the department (Muntingh
2006a:19).
THE DCS, DIU AND THE SIU
Special Investigations Unit
Following the initial work of the Jali Commission,
the Department of Correctional Services and the
Special Investigations Unit entered into a three-
year agreement in October 2002 that was later
extended to 2006. The first agreement was
focused on particular problem areas, namely the
medical aid fund, corruption at prisons,
management of DCS pharmacies, First Auto card
fraud, and mismanagement of assets (Portfolio
Committee on Correctional Services 2008). The
second three-year agreement was entered into in
2006 with a particular focus on procurement (as
the DCS is in the process of entering into a
number of large contracts) and asset management,
with particular reference to DCS farms.1
Although it has not been confirmed by the SIU or
the DCS, the so-called 'large contracts' are
understood to refer to the installation of security
technology, security fencing and nutritional
services (Du Plessis 2006). 
The results of the DCS-SIU agreement have to
date been impressive: R34,9m was recovered (this
includes R5,6m in assets under restraint); savings
amounting to R3,4b were secured; disciplinary
action was recommended in 1 183 cases; criminal
action was recommended in 327 cases; and ten
professionals (primarily doctors) were reported to
their professional bodies (Portfolio Committee on
Correctional Services 2008). More recent figures
indicate that 701 officials were investigated for
medical aid fraud.2 The services of the SIU do,
however, not come free of charge and under the
first agreement the DCS paid the SIU between
R5,5m and R6m per year. Under the second
agreement the costs escalated to R10m per year. 
The SIU provides the DCS with specialist skills to
provide integrated forensic solutions relating to
forensic audits and investigations; remedial legal
action; and systemic improvements and risk
management. Importantly, the SIU is a state
institution, which means that the state avoids the
more expensive option of subcontracting the
private sector for such services. Despite the
escalating costs, there is really no alternative at
this stage. The costs incurred are also dwarfed by
the size of the DCS budget (R11,67b for 2008/9).
At less than 0.1 per cent of the department’s
2008/9 budget, the R10m per year spent on the
SIU is a wise investment and yields reasonable
returns for the state. 
Even though public reports on the SIU's
investigation results may be perceived by some to
be detrimental to the department's public image,
they nonetheless communicate the clear message
that something is in fact being done about
corruption. Unfortunately, recent media reports
not only failed to make this point, but also failed
to describe the systemic achievements facilitated
by the SIU's involvement with the DCS. Increased
transparency can, in the long run, only benefit the
department's public image. 
Departmental Investigating Unit
The Departmental Investigating Unit (DIU) was
established in 2004 to meet the minimum anti-
corruption capacity requirements developed by
the Department of Public Service and
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Administration (DPSA 2006). From the initial
four investigators appointed, it has now grown to
18 investigators drafted from the SIU, SARS,
Directorate Special Operations in the NPA, and
the SAPS Organised Crime Unit. The capacity of
the DIU is in the process of being further
increased with 75 of a targeted 500 investigators
trained to assist at regional level.3 Upon
completion of investigation, cases from the DIU
are referred to the Code Enforcement Unit of the
DCS for disciplinary action. The results have been
equally impressive with a conviction rate of 98 per
cent over the past two years, involving more than
100 cases.4
CHALLENGES AHEAD
Fighting corruption in the prison system is not
without challenges and the following will
highlight a number of these. The work of the SIU
and DIU has demonstrated the successes possible
with investigations aimed at fraud and corruption
where the state had lost or stands to lose large
amounts of money. The challenges described
below emanate from the other pillars of an
effective anti-corruption strategy, namely
prevention, public awareness, and institution
building.
SUSTAINED DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Given the findings of the Jali Commission and the
work of the SIU one would have expected a
consistent, if not growing, trend in disciplinary
actions against DCS officials, resulting in a
significant proportion of dismissals. The increase
in the number of DCS officials (from 30 199 in
1998 (DCS 1999:39) to 40 795 in 2006/7 (D CS
2007:140)) should also have been reflected in a
natural increase in the number of disciplinary
sanctions. Trends in disciplinary sanctions
imposed, however, suggest differently, as shown in
Figure 1.5 The most obvious is the see-saw figure
in total disciplinary sanctions imposed, from
more than 2 600 in 1998, dropping to 1061 in the
following year but climbing to just below 2 500 in
2000/1. The high number of disciplinary actions
during 1997 and 1998 were the result of the
investigations undertaken by the Public Service
Commission (PSC) and the DPSA. The spike in
2001-3 can be attributed to the early work of the
Jali Commission and the SIU. During the first
three years of the SIU's involvement in the DCS
(2002-2005), the total number of disciplinary
actions dropped to a meagre 224 cases in 2004/5,
but the fruits were harvested the following year
when disciplinary sanctions climbed to 1 850, the
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primarily related to medical aid and social grant
fraud. 
Dismissals, however, remain a rare event in the
DCS. The highest number of dismissals was 264
in 2005/6, or 14 per cent of total disciplinary
sanctions imposed. In the following year, 2006/7,
the total number of disciplinary actions dropped
to 367 with only 33 dismissals. 
The see-sawing in the number of disciplinary
actions taken against employees of the department
may reflect an attitude, or even a decision, by DCS
management that the 'SIU and DIU will take care
of discipline'. If this is indeed the case, it is
extremely unfortunate. The two investigating units
are there to support the DCS with specialist skills
and knowledge and to provide comprehensive
forensic solutions, but they do not replace the day-
to-day duty of every manager in the department
to enforce the disciplinary code and promote good
performance. Enforcement of the disciplinary
code by every operational manager also lends
sustainability to the achievements of the
investigations into corruption and
maladministration, by making compliance with
prescripts and codes part of organisational culture.
MAKING THE ACHIEVEMENTS PART
OF BUSINESS AS USUAL
Many of the problems relating to corruption and
maladministration that the DCS has faced over
the past ten years have their roots in poor systems
and inadequate controls. This, therefore, forms an
important focus area of the SIU's interaction with
the department. Particular risks identified in this
regard are lack of internal controls; inadequate
asset management; and lack of effective
monitoring and evaluation systems (Portfolio
Committee on Correctional Services 2008).
Addressing these issues is difficult as the
department is complex: it has 237 prisons, a staff
corps in excess of 40 000, an estimated 360 000
people circulating through the prison system
annually, and it is highly dependent on service
providers for goods (e.g. food and material). The
fact that the department had received five
consecutive qualified audits by 2006/7 (a feat
shared only by the Department of Home Affairs)
is indicative of the challenges faced by the
department and its inability to deal with them. 
The 2006/7 DCS Annual Report reflects a number
of key outputs related to improving governance
that were not achieved or partially achieved,
whilst others were fully achieved. Although the
asset register was not completed, 970 officials
were trained in financial and supply chain
management, yet this positive achievement was
offset by the fact that the newly trained officials
were apparently not deployed (DCS 2007:25). On
the other hand, a baseline of risks was established,
and 60 disciplinary hearings related to fraud and
corruption were held, with a 92 per cent
conviction rate. Vetting of departmental staff
turned out to be a major challenge and of the 500
forms submitted to the NIA for vetting, only 290
were completed. The DCS has also developed
numerous (21) policies aligned to the White
Paper on Corrections but only five per cent of
targeted managers were trained in these policies.
In short, while progress has been made, changing
the direction and the culture of such a large
organisation is not easy, especially one that has
significant historical baggage. Accurate strategic
planning with achievable targets must map the
path ahead and it will primarily be up to
Parliament, by means of the Portfolio Committee
on Correctional Services, to see that these are
indeed achieved. In this regard it can draw on the
Department of Public Service and Administration
and the Public Service Commission as the




The Jali Commission had a real and substantive
expectation that the Office of the Inspecting Judge
would be more active in combating corruption. It
was disappointed that this oversight structure
failed to use its powers to conduct its own
investigations and to hold, for example, a
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Commission of Inquiry as it is mandated to do
(Correctional Services Act 1998:S90 (5) & (6)).
Correctly, the Commission saw the treatment of
prisoners as inextricably linked to corruption. 
A 2001 amendment to the Correctional Services
Act saw the removal of the power to inspect and
report on 'corruption and dishonest practices'
from the mandate of the Judicial Inspectorate (Act
32:2001:Section 31). The Jali Commission
regarded this amendment as ill-conceived (Jali
Commission 2006:587). The fact that reporting on
'corruption and dishonest practices' remained
within the mandate of the Inspecting Judge of
Prisons (JIOP) was in all likelihood the result of
an omission on the part of the drafters of the
amendment. The first version of the Correctional
Services Amendment Bill (B32 of 2007) attempted
to remove the power of the Inspecting Judge, but
this failed and the final version of the Bill adopted
by Parliament retained the power of the
Inspecting Judge to report on corrupt and
dishonest practices. During the deliberations on
the Bill it was clear that civil society, the Portfolio
Committee and the Judicial Inspectorate were in
agreement with the Jali Commission that the
treatment of prisoners is indeed 'inextricably
linked to corruption'.
While the SIU and the DIU have focused on
grand corruption, very little has been done to
address the so-called petty corruption that takes
place in prisons daily. When a prisoner has to pay
R10 for an extra blanket in winter or R2 to make a
phone call, it may sound like petty corruption, but
seen across the entire prison system and adding
up all the R10 and R2 payments, it is not so
'petty'. Moreover, the impact of such practices on
prisoners who do not have enough money to pay
the bribes is far in excess of their monetary value.
Current efforts to address this type of corruption
in the prison system have not been particularly
successful and have not been a focus of the SIU,
DIU or the JIOP. 
Creating an environment where prisoners feel free
to report corruption without fear of reprisal
appears to be very difficult. The JIOP recorded a
mere 398 complaints from prisoners alleging
corruption in 2007/8 (Office of the Inspecting
Judge 2008:17) and 1 463 in 2005/6 (Of fice of the
Inspecting Judge 2006:11).6 The PSC's National
Anti-Corruption Hotline received only 21
complaints involving the DCS in 2006/7, after it
received 141 complaints involving the DCS the
previous year (Public Service Commission
2007:13). 
Responding to these complaints presents a further
challenge. Presumably these can be dealt with by
the DIU. However, with 18 investigators for the
entire department, it is too small to deal with the
problem adequately (Muntingh 2006:21).
Developing a mechanism to effectively investigate
allegations of corruption from prisoners remains a
significant shortcoming in the strategic response
to corruption. Hopefully the additional 500
regional officials being trained in investigation
will assist in this.  
PUBLIC REPORTING
Reporting on the investigation of corruption in
the DCS has been scant and the most
comprehensive report remains that of the Jali
Commission. Even the SIU reports only provide
cursory details, leaving many questions
unanswered as to the exact facts of the cases
handled.  Apart from holding offenders
accountable, investigations into corruption should
contribute to the broader process of prevention in
a number of ways:
• Investigations should build knowledge by 
improving understanding of how a particular
crime was committed, how it was detected and
what effect it had; and indicate systemic
weaknesses.
• Investigations should inform the risk 
assessment with reference to type of risk and
the extent of the risk. 
• The results of investigations, successful or not, 
should be made available to stakeholders from
government or civil society with the aim to
improve insight into the problem and to
demonstrate that effective action can and will
be taken against corrupt officials.
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The New South Wales Independent Commission
against Corruption (ICAC) regularly makes the
results of its investigations public in the form of
comprehensive reports. The reports are detailed,
providing not only a description of the offence in
question but also the history of the offence(s),
giving particular insight into the chain of events
preceding the offence and context in which it
occurred. It is also noteworthy that the reports are
available relatively soon after the investigation has
begun, often with interim reports being followed
by more comprehensive reports at a later stage;
both interim and final reports are made public.7
Apart from making reports available in the public
domain, the results of investigations ought to be
reported to key stakeholders, such as the oversight
institutions of Parliament, and in particular the
Portfolio Committee on Correctional Services and
the Standing Committee on Public Accounts
(SCOPA). Given the particular history of the
department and the findings of the Jali
Commission, there is a strong argument to be
made for specialised, regular and structured
reporting to Parliament on progress made in
addressing corruption.
Moreover, investigations must be communicated
to the staff of the department to demonstrate that
action has been taken and to provide staff with a
deeper understanding of the risks presented by
their work environment. Investigations have a
strong symbolic value that should be capitalised
on. Publishing the full results of investigations
would also serve to stimulate the discourse on
ethics and integrity among the staff corps.
In short, there are several reasons why the
findings of investigations should be made widely
available, not only because this is required in
terms of reporting duties, but also to create
awareness and develop understanding among the
staff of the department.
CONCLUSION
An organisation with more than 40 000
employees and a 'customer base' with a known
history of criminal involvement pose significant
challenges from a governance and corruption
perspective.  In the aftermath of the Jali
Commission it appears that the DCS has put in
place the basic investigative measures to combat
corruption. It also appears that systemic
improvements are ongoing and that this will in
due course limit the opportunities for corrupt
officials. According to the DCS the work of the
SIU and the DIU enjoy the support of officials in
general and that there has been a positive change
in the reporting of corruption.8 Challenges appear
to be at operational level and more particularly
with managers who seem to be reluctant in
enforcing discipline and compliance with the
relevant codes. It is indeed the indulgence by
managers of minor transgressions, and their
passivity, that pose the greatest risk to harvesting
the fruits of six years of active investigations by
the SIU and the DIU. 
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ENDNOTES
1 See Proclamation R 44 dated 28 November 2007 for a 
full description. 
2 Interview with Director of the DIU, 12 August 2008
3 Interview with Director of the DIU, 12 August 2008
4 Interview with Director of the Code Enforcement 
Unit, 12 August 2008
5 The data used in Figure 1 was extracted from the 
various annual reports of the DCS of the period
covered. It should be noted that the report for 2000/1
covers a 15-month period when the department
changed its reporting period from a calendar year to a
financial year.
6 Note that in the 2006/7 Annual Report of the JIOP the 
breakdown of complaints received is not provided.
7 See ICAC Investigation into the Department of 
Corrective Services: Fourth report - Abuse of official
Power and Authority, November 1999 and ICAC
Report on the investigation into the introduction of
contraband into the Metropolitan Remand and
Reception Centre, Silverwater, September 2004.
8 Interview with Director of the DIU, 12 August 2008
 
